Hace 13 años | Por --216577-- a nytimes.com
Publicado hace 13 años por --216577-- a nytimes.com

Interesante articulo de Paul Krugman. ¿Debemos salir o no del euro? Probablemente no.

Comentarios

asola33

¿Dónde están los listos que nos metieron en el euro? Quizás para ellos SI ha sido bueno.

c

pone los pelos de punta lo mal que estamos, pero es peor saber lo peor que vamos a estar dentro poco, y es que esto no lo para nadie

Shotokax

La verdad es que la economía es algo tan opaco y difuso que ya a uno le cuesta distinguir lo que es bueno y lo que es malo y, lo que es peor, los que van de listillos y expertos tampoco parecen acertar mucho, incluidos los políticos.

Lo que es un hecho es que con la burbuja inmobiliaria y el euro muchos creían que España era como Alemania o Francia y no, era un espejismo, seguimos siendo un país a la cola de la Europa occidental, por debajo incluso de Italia, y lo que tenemos ahora son los sueldos de la peseta -o inferiores- con los precios de la Europa del euro.

Quiero pensar que a largo plazo el euro será algo bueno, pero a corto plazo ha sido una absoluta estafa para España, a merced de los designios de Alemania y otros países europeos fuertes, que controlan la divisa y el BCE en función de sus intereses. Y parece que en el seno de la UE -igual que en la llamada comunidad internacional en general- cada vez pinta menos.

fast_edi

Es fácil decir eso, pero si nuestra moneda fuera la peseta y nuestra deuda estuviera en euros, marcos o dólares ahora estaríamos flipando...

Creo que un comentario del NYT lo explica muy bien:

"It's the Euro!" is a tad too simplistic an argument to explain Spain's troubles. Granted, having a national currency and the option to devalue would be helpful, to some extent. However, many of Spain's problems are systemic and structural, including inflexible labour markets, which a currency devaluation would only provide a respite from, but not a fix.

Thus Spain would soon find itself in the same rut again. But even more importantly, and which contradicts the argument for devaluation, is the fact that even if Spain were not a member of the Euro, much of its debt would not be denominated in its national currency. Only a few countries have the luxury of the majority of their debt, whether internal or external, denominated in their own national currency.

A likelier scenario for Spain, had it not been in the Euro, is yes, it could have devalued, but all of it's external debt would have been in Euro's (or D-marks, Dollars and Yens), with all the troubles that would have entailed.

In your earlier column you cited the example of Iceland and how through devaluations and currency controls the country is coming out from under the crisis in a better state than Ireland. That is a false impression as currency controls will eventually have to be lifted, precipitating another fall in the value of the currency. A large portion of Iceland's debt is external, i.e. denominated in Euro's and Dollar's. The IMF's rescue package is all in Dollar's. Presumably, these dollars will be the ones used to pay for the inevitable capital flight from Icelandic Kronas once currency controls are lifted. In addition, the majority of Iceland's internal debt, although denominated in Icelandic Kronas, is inflation indexed, and thus any devaluation of the currency will subsequently increase all debt as devaluation will lead to a spike in inflation. Indeed, this is one of the frustrations in Iceland right now, that as the economy collapsed, the currency devalued, unemployment increased 8-fold, and inflation went through the roof, all debt increased significantly by virtue of most loans being either inflation indexed or foreign-currency indexed. Thus, not only did the price of real estate fall, the mortages on said real estate increased in line with increase in inflation.